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IMPUTED CONFLICTS OF INTEREST IN
INTERNATIONAL LAW PRACTICE
Geoffrey C. Hazard, Jr. *
I. INTRODUCTIO!\
Law practice is increasingly can-ied out through law firms, as distinct
from solo or dual practice. It is increasingly done by large and middle-
sized law firms, as distinct from small firms. In most American cities of
evcn modest size, for example, there are finns of twenty-five lawycrs
and more. In other common law countries, the law firm mode of practice
in recent years has arrived in full dress; indeed, English solicitor firms
are among the largest in the world, and getting larger. This model has
been penetrating the European civil law countries, pm1icularly Germany.
Belgium, and the !etherlands, some of the Asian countrics, and is
making appcarance in Hispanic America. The multi-mcmber law office
is the vvave of the present as well as of the future,
; Di~ljngui~hed Professor of La\o\', Hastings College of the I.aw, Univusirv of
California. and Trustee Pn)Jcssor of Law, University of Pennsylvania. B.A. Swarthmore
College. I'):;:;. LL.H Columbia University J ')54. Member 01' the bars of Califolllia and
PennsY!\3nia
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At the same time, law practice increasingly involves organizations as
clients, particularly corporations but also unincorporated associations
such as business partnerships, joint ventures, trade associations,
specialized government units, "NGOs," and other types,
Thus, on both sides of the client-lawyer relationship there has
emerged the phenomenon of "bureaucratization," In bureaucratization,
functions are performed, not on the basis of proprietary right or inherited
authority but through legally-prescribed procedures (including those in
contracts such as corporate char1ers) under the direction of legally-
constituted officials such as managing partners, [n simpler tenns, client-
lawyer transactions in many legal engagements today take place between
a lawyer who is a member of an organization and a corporate operative
vvho is also a member of an organization, often a very large one, 1
Undcrstanding the implications of these transfonnations is sti II a
work in progress, Better understanding is becoming more imperative as
law practice becomes increasingly global. The rules of ethics and the
law governing lawyers in other countries are somewhat different from
the counterparts under American law,2 In some respects the rules abroad
are more permissive than ours, particularly in regard to the concept of
conflict of interest as applied to law firms, Paradoxically, perhaps, this
difference results from the latcr development of legal ethics in Europe,
which is also a work in progress, The delay in that development has
permitted what may be a better measured response. It certainly has
resulted in some competitive disadvantage for American-based
international law firms.
II. THE TRADITION
Traditionally, the model organization for conduct of the practice of
law has been thc solo practitioner. Until the beginning of the nineteenth
century indeed, virtually the only kind of "law firm" was the
combination of a solo practitioner and an apprentice. Only in modern
times has the model extended to include the small finn - two or three
lawyers, perhaps five including associates and apprentices.
I. See genero!!y SUSAN SHAPIRO, TANGLED LOYAI.TIES: CONFLICT OF INTEREST IN
LE(j!\L PR..\CT1CT (2002)
2, ,)'ee gellerollJ' ancy Moore, Regulating Law Firm Conflicts in the 2 j't CenrLlly:
Implications 0/ the Globalization a/Legal Services alld the Grmv,th 0/ the "Mega Firm,"
18 GLO .J. lBj\(, ETHICS 521, 524 n,20 (2005).
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The rules of ethics for the legal profession accordingly have been
predicated on the traditional model of practice. Most of the rules of
ethics in all legal systems speak in tenns of "the lawyer" and are framed
in tell11S of an individual lawyer's conduct. For example, the American
rule governing conflict of interest is framed in those terms. 3 As stated in
Rule 1.7(a) of the American Bar Association Model Rules of
Professional Conduct: "[A] lawyer shall not represent a client if the
representation involve[s] a concurrent conflict of interest.,,4
Rule 1.7(a) goes on to define types of concurrent conflicts,) while
Rule 1.7(b) prescribes the procedure of "informed consent" whereby
such conflicts can be overcome. 6
Rule 1.9(a) of the ABA Model Rules. dealing with confiicts in
successive representation, also frames the prescription in terms of an
individual practitioner: "A lawyer who has f0ll11erly represented a client
. . . shall not thereafter represent another person in the same or a
substantially related matter in which that person"s interests are materially
adverse to the interests of the fonner client .... '"
III. THE IMPUTATION CONCEPT
Only in recent decades have the American rules come to
acknowledge the existence of law firms and to take account of the
additional ethical issues that are thereby entailed. The basic problem is
to decide the extent to which the several members of a multi-member law
firm should bc treated as a single personage for pU'1Joses of ethical and
legal responsibility. The term for addressing the problem is that of
"imputation," i.e., that a restriction on one lawyer in a fim1 should (or
should not) be imputed to other lawyers in tIle same finn. 8 The problem
of imputation arises most obviously among lawyers in law firms in
independent practice. However, it is also present among lawyers in the
law dep3l1ments of business corporations, other private organizations,
and in public agency law departments such as the corporation counsel for
a city or county or the office of an attorney general.
:I. MODFI RiLES OF PROF'I CONDL'n R 17 (20m)
4. Id at R 17{a)
5 fJ
6 fJ al R. 17Ih).
7 Jd at R 19(a)
X Id. at R I i ()
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As a practical matter. the most important lssue is the impuLttion or
cunflicts of interest among lawyers in a law firm, The basic approach in
the American rules has been that if one lawyer in a firm is personally
precluded from a prospective multiple representation, then ail lawyers in
the firm are similarly precluded. 9
For example, the American rule is if Lawyer A is engaged in a
transaction on behalf of Client X. Lawyer A is precluded from
participating in litigation against X, even in an unrelated matter.!O The
rule of individual preclusion governs not only litigation, but other
transactional matters that would involve material adversity to Client X,
The imputation rule is stated in Rule I, 10(a) of the ABA Model Rules as
follows: "While lawyers are associated in a firm, none of them shali
knowingly represent a client when anyone of them practicing alone
would be prohibited from doing so by Rules 1.7 or 1,9, unless, . , ," I!
I shall presently come to the "unless" clauses in Rule I, 10,
provisions limiting the scope of the general mle of imputation. The
important point about Rule 1, lOis its general scope, That is, the imputed
preclusion under Rule I, i°generally operates even if the matters are
entirely unrelated - for example, one matter conceming real estate, the
other a franchise agreement - and even if the other lawyer is in a branch
office across the country, Under the American rule governing America-
based law films, imputed preclusion operates across the world, Hence.
an engagement in a Moscow transaction can be the basis of a
disqualification motion in Califomia. 12
Another way of interpreting the imputation rule is that it imposes a
bureaucratic regimen on law firms by treating separate individuals as
legal functionaries,
IV, BUREAUCRATIZED CUE TS
A functionally related change in law practice arises from changes in
clientele. Traditionally, the rules of ethics have been modeled on the
conception of the cl ient as an individual, or perhaps a slnall business
partnership, In fact, in the ABA Model Code of Professional
Responsibility promulgated in 1970, the possibility that a client could be
9 See id.
10 fd,
II. Id. at R, 1.10(a),
12 See Thomas Morgan, Suing ([ Current Client. 9 GEO, j, l.le\! LTlill'S I !57
( 1996),
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a corporation \Vas 110t recognized in any of its Disciplinary Rules but
only in the comments as Ethical Considerations. I~ A major advance in
ethical analysis had to await Rule 1.13 of the Model Rules of
Professional Conduct, which addressed the "Organization as Client.,,!4
Even Rule 1.13 had only a cryptic reference to ethical problems arising
where the cl ient was a government entity: "The duty defined in this Rule
applies to govemmental organizations. . .. [However,] when the client
is a governmental organization, a different balance may be appropriate
between maintaining confidentiality and assuring that the wrongful
[official] act is prevented or rectified, for public business is involved.,,15
Today. much of law practice, and probably most of "high profile"
law practice, involves representation of corporations and other
organizations. It is a particularly important fact that in contemporary
practice many clients, and l11any more events of legal representation,
involve corporations and other organizations, In all such situations, the
client is a legal abstraction, operating through its "duly authorized
constituents,'" to use the terminology in Rule 1.13. 16 Rule 1.13 in
essence is an integration of basic principles of the law of business
organizations and the basic principles of professional ethics. Indeed, it is
fair to say that Rule 1.13 was the most impOJ1ant contribution of the
ethics revision expressed in the Model Rules compared with the Model
Code. The formulation in Rule ].13 clearly recognizes impOJ1ant
distinctions between the organization as client and the corporate
personnel \vilh \I\:hol11 the lawyer interacts in representing the entity. I:
However, so far as contlicts of interest are concerned, the ModeJ
Rules retained the basic approach to imputation prescribed in the Model
Code. Rule 1.10 of the ModeJ Rules has been quoted above. DR 5-
13. !'ViOJ)U, Com OF PRUF"L RESP01\SIBII.ITY (1982). EC:'- IX stated that "'[a] lawyer
cmployed or retailK'd by a corporation or similar entity owes allegiance to the entity and
not to a s[ockhl)lder. director. officer. employee, representative, or other person
connected with the entity." Jel at EC 5-18. EC 5-24 recognized that an clhical problem
could be presell1eJ if a corroratc official tried to give "direction" to the lawyer's
""professional Judgment" on bchalf of the organization, but proviJed no guidance as to
how such a problem should be resolved. Jd. at EC 5-24.
14. MODI:L RlilS OF PRO,'I, CONDUCT R. 1.13 (2003)
15 jJ at R. 1. I :"1 emt. [9]
i () jJ al R IJ:j
17. Thus. Rule J 1:"1(1)) provides that. in general, the lawyer must be guided by the
""hest inleresl of the \)rganization'" JrI. at R. I 13(b). Rule 1.13(c). (d). and (e) prescribe
somc pathways of rcsponse for a lawyer confronted with intransigence by a wrong-doing
L'orporiltc \;perati\e Jc/. at R. ].1 :"1(c)-(e).
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105(D) of the Model Code provided that: "If a lawyer IS required to
decline employment or to withdraw from employment under a
Disciplinary Rule, no ... other lawyer affiliated with him or his firm,
may accept or continLle such employment." IX
The broadly framed imputation rule has its defenders in this country
and is rarely troublesome to lawyers in small firms. Lawyers in small
firms generally practice down the hall from each other, so to speak, and
are "joined at the hip" financially. Professional intimacy with clients.
particularly individual clients, is very real and indeed one of the rewards
of traditional small firm practice. Hence, the imputation concept has a
physical, social, and financial reality that lawyers in small finlls
experience and accept.
However, the imputation rule has proved inconvenient and
unsatisfactory to many middle-sized and large American law firms. It is
also inconvenient and unsatisfactory in many applications to law
departments of government. 19 It is proving even more unsatisfactory to
international finns, i.e., those with branches in other countries. Among
other considerations, for American (and Canadian) international finns.
compctiti ve disadvantage is involved because the rules and practice
concerning imputation work differently in most other countries. There
is, however. considerable common ground.
V. COMMON GROUND 1: ADVERSITY IN CONCURRENT
REPRESENTA nON
In all legal systems it is recognized that an individual lawyer may not
properly represent clients whose interests are in conflict. Thus, Lawyer
A representing Client X in a matter cannot Lll1dertake representation of
Client Y in that same matter, absent a reasonable accommodation of their
18. fvIO[)f'L Ru[[s OF PROF'L Co DUCT DR 5-1 05(D) (1 n2).
19. The genc:ral principle of imputation in Mode! Rule 1.13 is both under-inclusive
and over-inclusiw as applied to government lawyers. It is under-inclusive because it
does not address the point that a lawyer in government service must not improperly shape
legal advice to favor a private party while in the government. See vlODEL RULES OF
PROF'L CONDLeT R. 1.II(a), (c). It is over-inclusive because it does not adequately
facilitate an important aspect of American government, movement of lawyers to and from
government service - the "revolving door." See id. at R. l.11(bl, (d). As stated in
Comment [41 to Rule Ill, "the rules governing lawyers presently or formerly employed
by a government agency should not be so restrictive as to inhibit transfer of employment
to and from government." ld. at R. l.ll cmt. [4].
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interests and informed consent on both sides. 2u Most obviously, a lawyer
representing a client in litigation cannot properly represent an adverse
party in that same litigation. In that context the justification goes beyond
the issue of loyalty to the client and preservation of client confidences,
and it implicates the need of the court to have the full exploration of the
issues produced through adversarial representation. 21
However, the justification for personal preclusion extends to other
litigation even if in an unrelated subject matter. Thus, Lawyer A
representing Client X in a matter cannot undertake litigation adverse to
Client X even if the subject matter in the two is unrelated. It is regarded
as unfair to the client that the same lawyer appear as a loyal and
confidential counselor in one dispute, but champion of an opponent in
another concurrent dispute. Implicit in this application of the principle is
recognition of the psychological and moral dimensions of the trusting
relationship - loyalty - that the client is entitled to enjoy. More
pragmatically, confidences that are only incidental in the one matter, or
even irrelevant to it, can be significant in another matter, even
confidences concerning facets that are technically irrelevant.
By the same token, most lawyers would find it difficult or impossible
to be a loyal advocate for a client in one litigation, but a resolute
opponent in another pending case. Certainly that would be so \vhere the
client IS an individual or a personally-managed paJinership or
corporation.
Vl. COMMO . GROUND II: ADVERSITY IN SLCCESSIVE
REPRESENTATION
The same principle is extended in all legal systems to preclude
adversity toward a fonner client in litigation concerning the same matter
in which the lawyer previously acted for that client. 22 Thus, Lawyer A
may not undcJiake representation against Client X in a matter in which
Lawyer A previously provided assistance to Client X. TIle classic case
of impropriety is that of a lawyer attacking the validity of a transaction
that he previously handled, for example, contesting a conveyance that the
20 Sct! genera/h' GEOFfREY C. HV.>,RI). JR. & .'\l\Cill() DO'!D!. LHiAL ETllleS ;\
C()yH'AR:\TI\I: STlj))Y 179 (2004).
21. See RIST.\TFML'-.iT (THIRDl OF TIH: LAW G()\'II{ 1,« L\\\\TRS ~ 121 elll!. h
(200())
22. See HV ..\JW & DONO!. SUfII'Ll note 20. at !l)].
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lawyer himself had drafted. The traditional vernacular is that a lavvyer
may not "switch sides."
However, this extension of the principle reaches a point where
competing considerations begin to be felt and then possibly supersede the
rule of preclusion. It is true that a lawyer must not attack legal structures
which the lawyer previously erected. But it is also tme that lawyers in
independent practice must be able to serve a succession of clients. The
possibility and necessity for a succession of clients in a succession of
matters is the very essence of independent law practice. A lawyer must
be able to have successive engagements even in the same locality where
a previous undertaking was consummated - law practice is mainly
"local" in this sense. A lawyer must also be able to take on new matters
in the same general legal field as in previous engagements - law practice
is mainly specialized in this sense. But successive engagements for
different clients entail the possibility of a conflict of interest, especially if
the engagements are in the same locality or the same field of
specialization.
Thus the vel-y concept of independent law practice at some point is
inconsistent with the concept of perfect loyalty to a client. Independent
law practice requires that a lawyer's faithfulness to a client be
unavoidably transitory, while perfect loyalty would require a lawyer
never to be adverse to one who had once been a client.
The inconsistency is captured in the formulation of the rule of
preclusion against subsequent adversity. The key concept is that
adversity is precluded, not in all subsequent matters, but only in the
"same or a substantially related" matter. For example, Lawyer A who
drafted a document for Client X would be precluded from representation
adverse to Client X not only in a direct attack on the document, but also
in an effort to impose an interpretation of the document against Client X
in favor of Client Y. Consider, for example, interpretation of a
noncompete clause in a partnership severance agreement that was drafted
for Client X and is now to be contested by Client Y.
However, some subsequent representations that more or less relate to
the original transaction would not be regarded as "substantially related."
What about a suit for unfair competition by one former partner against
another, where the lawyer had done trade association work concerning
the partnership? Or a suit by a tenant against a landlord concerning
occupancy rights in property as to which the lawyer had previoLlsly done
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title examination work? Most analysts could conclude that the matters in
such situations are not "substantially related."
The concept of "substantially related" is clear enough for practical
purposes in most contexts. But it is unavoidably ambiguous and
indetelminate in other contexts. Experience suggests that there is no
satisfactory way of reducing the concept's ambiguity. It would be
generally impractical and invidious to have special rules fo;' specialized
fields of practice. Resort to additional adverbs - "closely," for example -
would not help much, if at all. Hence, we simply have to live with a
measure of unceliainty - indeed "substantial" uncertainty.
Once attention moves beyond these simple cases, greater analytic
and practical difficulties are encountered. As we shall see, all of the
difficulties are magnified where the personal preclusion rule is coupled
with the principle of imputation.
VII. TRANSACTIONAL PRACTICE VERSUS LITIGATIO PRACTICE
The rules of ethics, and specifically the rule governing conflicts of
interest, originally evolved regarding litigation practice. 23 A conflict of
interest in litigation practice usually has higher visibility than one in
transaction practice, because the process of litigation itself makes the
adverse relationship of the parties directly apparent, Furthernlore, the
courts have always had an interest in prohibiting conflicts of interest by
the advocates in litigation, because such a conflict threatens the integrity
of the couns' own functions. Moreover, when a litigation conflict is
presented. there is an immediate remedy and, at least in the common law
systems, an immediate forum for enforcement of the remedy. That
remedy is a motion to compel the offending advocate to withdraw or. as
we say today, a motion for disqualification.
The problem of adversity in transaction practice is inherently more
complicated and often less visible. In typical simple litigation, the
parties arc aligned as P v. D. Even in multi-paIiy litigation the
alignments as between friend and foe are usually pretty clear. In most
litigation the involvement of the interested p311icipants is open and
evident. Of course there can be conflicts and other ethical problems
concerning parties who are interested but undisclosed, such as the
liabiiity insurers who stand behind defendants in modern tOl1 litigatioll.
:?:; S,'e .Jonathan Rose. Till' Legal Profession in ,,\fedieml England A His/OIT IJf
N'Ol.'.lila/;IJ/I . .:IX SYR\l'LSf L. R,·\. 1.0-8 (1998).
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But these arc more difficult precisely because they have clements of
transaction practice embedded in them; for example, the underlying
contractual relationship between insurer and insured or, in patent
litigation, between patentee and licensee,
In contrast with the typically open and obviolls adversity in litigation
are the problems of conf1icts of interest in transaction practice. In
transaction practice, it is often by no means clear whether or not there is
adversity among the participants. On one hand, in economic terms every
transaction between parties across a table can be "win-win" - an
exchange favorable to both or all parties. Thus, both the buyer and seller
of a property benefit from a sale at a proper market price under proper
covenants, representations, and warranties. In a loan transaction, both
borrower and lender stand to benefit if the terms are right, and so also in
any transactions among any set of participants.
At the same time, in transaction practice it is often unclear whether
participants aligned on the "same side" have an appropriate identity of
interest. A familiar situation involves entrepreneurs seeking to create
and operate an enterprise, such as a business partnership or a corporation.
One pal1icipant may be the provider of capital, the other the provider of
management; one may be a senior seeking a stable investment, the other
a junior seeking to make a fortune; one may be risk-averse, the other
adventurous; etc.
The ntles governing conf1icts of interest pelmit the participants to
assess whether their interests can be coordinated, and hence represented
by one lawyer, or are too adverse, and hence require each to have
separate counsel. The assessment ordinarily proceeds on the basis of a
judgment by the lawyer and counseling from that lawyer accordingly, as
to whether there was a conf1ict of material dimension. Traditionally, the
cou11s usually accepted the lawyer's judgment that concurrent
representation was permissible. In recent years, the courts have
confronted claims by disgnmtled clients arguing, in hindsight, that they
were not adequately informed and counseled. In response, the cOUI1s
have come to disapprove concurrent representation of buyer and seller or
borrower and lender in various contexts. 24
Many, if not all of these cases involved the same lawyer providing
representation to both or all parties. None of the cases I have found
involved one law finn lawyer representing one party and another lawyer
24. See. e.g.. Iowa Supreme Court 8d. of Profl Ethics v. Wagner. 599 NW.2d 721
(!mva 1999); Baldasarrc v. Butler. 625 i\.2d 458 (N.J. 1993).
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in the same firm representing the other. It would not be unrealistic to
consider the "two lawyer" situation to be different, professionally and
functionally, from that where one lawyer is involved. However, under
the imputation rule as fonnulated in the ethics rules in this country, such
a differentiation is not permitted.
V Ill. EXCEPT10NS TO THE IMPUTAT10N PR1NC1PLE
The rule that disqualification of one lawyer in a finn requires
disqualifIcation of all others in the finn has been subject to important
exceptions almost since the beginning of the modem codification of
professional ethics.
One of the first exceptions concerned lawyers moving in and out of
government, an exception now stated in Model Rule 1.11 (mentioned
above). 2~ The problem was directly encountered under the Code of
Professional Responsibility in Armstrong v. lvlcAfpin, a case involving a
lawyer who had left service in the federal government. 26 The
government itself, wanting protection against the "revolving door"
movement, strongly supported an exception applying the same
imputation rules to forn1er government lav,'yers as would apply to
lawyers moving from one private practice 6etting to another. 27 That
position was codified in Rule 1.11 of the Model Rules of Professional
Conduct and has subsequently been adopted in most jurisdictions. A
recent California case illustrates the consequences of applying the private
practice standard to legal employments in the public sector: A lawyer
forn1erly in private practice became corporation counsel for San
Francisco, whereupon the entire staff of the city's legal department was
subject to a disqualification motion based on a conflicting engagement
by the lawyer in his prior private affiliation. 28
A corollary of this exception concems whether there should be
imputation among lawyers within a government law office. As noted
above, this situation was recognized but not resolved in the Comment to
Rule 1.13 of the Model Rules. The need for some kind of an exception
responds to two-fold circumstances. For one thing, government lawyers
simply do not have the same kind of proprietary interest in their
25. S/:,(' 10DIL RLl YS OF PROF' L CONDUCT R. 1.1 I (20m).
26. A"l11s!l'IIl!g ". AkA/pin. 625 F2d 4:\3. 436 (2d Cir J9~O). F<lculed. 449 US 1106
(J 9~ I)
27. lei at 445.
2X Citv and ('nuntv of SF v. Cobra Sl)lutions.lnc. 135 P3d 20 ((·al. 20(6)
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employment relationship as do lawyers in a private law firm. For
another, the organization of government legal staff-; does not correspond
to the unitary partnership or corporate form characteristic of private law
firms. In some states, for example, virtually all iawyers employed at the
state level are at least nominally under the authority of the state attorney
general Formally, they are all accordingly in the sallle "firnl."
Applying the imputation rule in such a setting \voulcl preclude
government lawyers from representing agencies engaged ill litigcl1ion
against each other, even where state law concerning standing to sue
permits such adversity.
A similar problem arises for lawyers in prosecutor and public
defender offices. Should the concept of imputation apply across all sllch
offices, including those in small counties with two or three lawyer statfs
and in big city departments with dozens or more la'vvyers'! The courts
have generally declined to apply the same rule as governs private
practice, but have often struggled in developing alternati Yes ..''1
Regarding lawyers in private law firm practice, a similar but much
narrower set of exceptions has evolved. Somc of these exceptions
address restrictions in Rule 1.8. That rule includes a number of specific
conflicts rules. For example, subsection 1.8(a) conccms business
deal ings between client and lawyer and subsection 1.8( i) concerns
lawyers having a family relationship such as parent and child or
marriage. 30 The imputation rule in Rule 1.IO(a) itself formerly limited
imputation of the Rule 1.8 restrictions to that in subsection 1.8(c), which
has a prohibition against documenting a gift from client to lawyer. 3! By
an amendment proposed by the ABA in 2002, the formulation of Rule
1. 10 has been changed so it is both broader and narrower than it was
previously.
As amended, Rule 1.10 would restrict imputed disqual ification when
the predicate disqualification arises from "a personal interest of the
prohibited lawyer.,,32 Such a "personal interest" could result from either
a representation barred by the general conflicts limitations in Rules 1.7
and 1.9, or from any of the restrictions in Rule 1.8. including those
beyond Rule 1.8(c) referred to above. 33 When such a personal interest is
29. Compare State v. William F., 670 App 200,i). \\'ith Slate v.
Pennington, 851 P.ld 494 (NM. Ct. App. 1993).
30. MODEL RCLF.S OF PROF'L CO'-!DUCT R. 1.8(a), (i) (20(),i)
31. Id. at R. 1.8(c).
32. ld. at R. 1.10.
33. See id. at R. 1.7-l.LJ.
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involved, it is not imputed to other lawyers in the firm unless it presents
"a significant risk of materially limiting the representation ... by the
remaining lawyers in the fiml.,,34 The applications of this latter concept
are manifold and unavoidably ambiguous. Comment [3] to revised Rule
1. 10 states:
Where one lawyer ... could not effectively represent a
given client because of strong political beliefs ... and
the personal beliefs of the lawyer will not materially
limit the representation by others in the fiml, the firm
should not be disqualified. On the other hand, if an
opposing party ... were owned by a lawyer in the law
firm, and others in the finn would be materially limited
. . . because of loyalty to that lawyer, the personal
disqualification ... would be imputed to all others in the
firm. 35
It seems obvious that "significant risk of materially limiting the
representation" would be much less likely to exist among lawyers in a
large firm than among those in a two or three person firm. Such, for
example, would be the differential effect of Lawyer A being a member of
the board of directors of a company against which Lawyer B of the same
fiml is participating in a contract negotiation.
Another set of exceptions deals with situations where a lawyer
moves from firm to firm. Rule 1.9(b) provides that the imputation
"taint" is removed from a lawyer who leaves a firm, unless while in the
firm the lawyer had personally acquired confidential infomlation in the
matter in question. 36 Rule I. 10(b) provides that the firm from which a
"tainted" lawyer has left is no longer barred by imputation, unless there
are lawyers remaining in the firm who have confidential information in
the matter in question. 37 These exceptions had been recognized in the
decisional law under the Code of Professional Responsibility, responding
to motions to disqualify. and thereafter were codified in the Model Rules
of J9;;;3.
~4 It!. at R 11O(a)
:;5 Jd at R. I .10 em!. [3].
36. lei at R. 19(b)
,..,
Jd at R I 1O( h)."
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Another exception has been more recently formulated to deal with
possible conflicts from exchange of infollnation between client and
lawyer prior to fomlation of a client-lawyer relationship. Such an
exchange typically will include identification of the contemplated
opposite patty and description of the matter to be undertaken.
Conducting such interviews is a necessary aspect of law practice.
particularly in independent firms, precisely because avoidance of
improper conflicts of interest has become so salient an aspect of
professional ethics. If the exchange results in an engagement, the
infonnation is covered by the lawyer's duty of confidentiality and the
engagement is covered by the lawyer's duties of loyalty, diligence, etc.
But it may be that no engagement results because, for example, the
matter is outside the law finn's field of competence, or would overload
its capabilities, or is unpromising in tenns of fees, or would involve a
conflict of interest. What then?
Here again, the first authoritative responses were judicial decisions
addressing motions to disqualify. The underlying tension was between
the prospective client's right to communicate freely when in search of a
lawyer, and the lawyer's right and duty to ascertain whether the
prospective matter was professionally acceptable. Problems of this kind
of course can arise in solo practice as well as in law finn practice.
Hence, lawyers in ali forms of practice have leamed to be guarded and to
proceed incrementally in receiving infonnation about a prospective
engagement. The courts have generally been protective when the lawyer
has been reasonably cautious in the initial interface with a prospective
client. The lawyer who has been suitably guarded may subsequently take
on representation of a party adverse to the former prospective client. 38
Neveliheless, the interchange between a prospective client and a solo
practitioner, followed by an engagement of that lawyer by an opposing
party, presents a different problem in practical terms from that where the
original interchange was with one lawyer in a firm and the subsequent
engagement established through another. It can be a matter of fact, and
of law finn procedure, that information in an initial interview be
confined to the interviewing lawyer alone. If the lawyer is a solo, the
information has been received by the office. If the lawyer is in a finn,
the infonnation may not have been received by the office. In law finns
of even modest size, it can be a fact and a law finn policy that the
38. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LA W GOVERNING LA WYERS § I5 emt. e (2000).
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information from a prospective client not be transmitted beyond the
fiml 's conflicts-checking procedures. In large law firms, and ones of
national or international scope, it will be routine that transmission be thus
limited.
The ABA has now codified a rule addressing this set of problems.
Model Rule 1.18 requires the lawyer receiving such information from a
prospective client to maintain it essentially on the same basis as
confidences from a client. 39 Hence, that lawyer will be disqualified from
subsequent adverse representation unless, as provided in Rule 1.18(d)( l),
infonned consent had been obtained from the prospective client. 4o
However, Rule l.18(d)(2) limits the disqualifying effect of the reception
if: (l) the lawyer avoided "exposure to more disqualifying information
than was reasonably necessary;" (2) that lawyer was screened from a
subsequent adverse representation; and (3) notice was sent promptly to
the erstwhile prospective client. 41
IX. EXEMPTION FROM IMPUTATION BY CONTRACT, IMPLIED OR
EXPRESS
The rules against conflicts of interest generally can be obviated by
consent on the paI1 of the affected clients. Model Rule 1.7(b) as revised
by the ABA in 2002 provides: "Notwithstanding the existence of a
concurrent conflict of interest ... a lawyer may represent a client if: (I)
the lawyer reasonably believes that the lawyer will be able to provide
competent and diligent representation to each affected client; [and] (4)
each affected client gives informed consent, confirmed in writing.,,42
10del Rule 1.9(a) has an essentially identical provision goveming
representation adverse to f0l111er clients. 43 Both of these provisions are
carried forward from the 1983 version of the Model Rules, with the
addition of the provision that the informed consent be confirmed in
writing. In tum, they substantially correspond to a counterpart provision
in DR 5-1 OS(e) of the 1970 Code of Professional Responsibili ty 44
39. MOUEL RULES 01 PRor'L CONDUCT R. ].] 8 (2003).
40. ld at R J] 8(d)( I).
41. Jd at R 1l8(d)(2).
42. Jd. at R. I.7(b)
43 Id. at R. 19(a)
44. DR 5- J 05(C) provided: '"IAj lawyer may represent multiple clients if it is oh\ious
that he can adequately represent the interest of each and if each consents .. atin full
disclosure of the possible effecl of such representation on the exercise of his inderendent
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These provisions are conventionally referred to as "waiver" although
strictly speaking they are matters of contract. [n any event, the key
problems in their application are: (I) whether there is a conflict of
interest in the multiple representations; (2) whether it is objectively
reasonable that the lawyer or law firm undertake the multiple
representation; (3) whether the client has been adequately infomled not
only of the contlict but also of the implications regarding the clients'
interests; and (4) whether the client thereupon gave consent. Under
careful professional practice, and now by rule, the consent must be
confinned in writing.
It is safe to say that administration of the conflicts rules, including
seeking and obtaining waivers, is the most frequently encountered ethical
problem in contemporary law practice. Although the conflicts rules are
central in the Model Rules and were very impoliant in the previous Code
of Professional Responsibility, perhaps paradoxically it is unusual that
they be addressed in disciplinary proceedings.'+5 Rather, the procedural
context most often is either an effort to disqualify counser'!6 or a civil
liability suit for damages. 47
In any event. there are virtually infinite permutations of possible
conflicts of interest, of whether it is objectively appropriate for a lawyer
to undertake multiple representation, of whether the client has been
adequately informed of the conflict and its ramifications, and of whether
the client gave proper consent. In practice, a lawyer or law firm is
always at some risk if it proceeds with multiple representation when
there is even a colorable basis for saying there is a conflict of interest.
These days, if the underlying litigation or transaction turns out badly,
some kind of claim of malpractice often will ensue. In defense
representation in criminal cases, the claim will be of inadequate
professional judgment on behalf of each." MODEL CODE OF PROF'L REsPO 'SIBILlTY DR
5-1 05(Cl (1970)
45. For such a case, see State v. Callahan, 652 P.2d 708 (Kan. 1982). It is noteworthy
that the lawyer in that case had filed bankruptcy after malpractice in the conflicted
representation, thus rendering futile the more appropriate response by an injured client, a
civil action for damages ld.
46. Disqualification most often is sought by motion in the action the lawyer or law
tirm has become involved in as advocate for another party in litigation, see, eg.,
Westinghouse Elec. Corp. v. Kerr-McGee Corp, SilO F.2d 1311 (7th Cir. 1978), or, more
unusual, by injunction against participation in representation of a related transaction, see
tvlaritrans GP Inc. v. Pepper, Hamilton & Scheetz, (')02 A.2d 1277 (Pa. 1992).
47. ,)'ee RESTA rt'.MENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVER"1INCi LA WYERS ~ 130 (2000).
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representation; in civil litigation and transactions it may be a suit for
damages or a demand for forfeiture of fees.
X. CLAIMS OF CONFLlCT OF INTEREST HAVE SIMPLY BECOME A RISK OF
PH.ACTICE
The risk of claims of conflict of interest is greater in proportion to
the greater amount of different matters of representation a lawyer or law
firm undeJ1akes. The risk is greater more or less in proportion as the
firm engages on "both sides" of litigation and transaction matters, for
example, representation of both claimants and defendants in commercial
litigation, or representation of both lender and borrowers in commercial
finance. The risk is greater more or less in proportion to the size of the
fi1111, because finn size is more or less correlated to the firm's volume of
business. Handling conflicts of interest has become a central ethical and
management problem for all large law finns and for most middle-sized
firms.
Against claims or potential claims of conflict of interest, a law firm
has several layers of protection. The first of course is careful monitoring
of new and continuing matters to detect conflicts involved in an initial
engagement or conflicts arising as a ITlalter develops over its pendency.48
The second is obtaining a waiver when a conflict has arisen. However,
consent after a conflict has arisen can be withheld by any of the affected
clients and for any reason or no reason; hence, consent in such
circumstances is not a reliable recourse from the law firm's viewpoint.
Xl. IMPLlED WAIVER
A third line of defense is available against the most typical remedy
pursued by an aggrieved client, the motion to disqualify. Disposition of
a motion to disqualify is conventionally and properly laid to rest in the
trial court's judicial discretion. The motion can be considered as an
injunction, and accordingly is subject to the traditional equitable
requirement of timeliness and the defense of laches, particularly the
effect on the client of the lawyer whose disqualification is sought.
Alternativcly. the motion can be considered an incident of a coul1's
authority to controJ its docket and the conduct of advocates appearing
4X. A conJlic\. although not present milially. can deveiop from addition of parties In
litigation or ofparlicipants III a transaction
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before it. Under either approach, the court has substantial discretion to
refuse a remedy in the absence of demonstrable injury or risk to the
complaining party.
It is here that the rule of imputation is important. There arc many
situations where a single lawyer could not handle unrelated matters for
two different clients. The difficulty arises, not from the relationship of
the matters, but from the personal relationship of the lawyer to each of
the clients. As either or both clients might exclaim, "How can you at the
same time be my professional friend and also my professional
antagonist?" No such personal nexus is necessarily encountered when
two lawyers in the same firm are involved.
The absence of demonstrable injury or risk will be clear when the
matters at issue are unrelated and when there is no risk of bad interface
between client and lawyer. Thus, if Lawyer A in a firm is handling
Matter I for Client X, and Lawyer B in the same firm is handling Matter
II for Client Y, the claim of conflict of interest will require that some
relationship be shown between Matter I and Matter [I and, even then,
ordinarily will depend entirely on the rule of imputation: Lawyer A
personally cannot handle Matter I because Lawyer B personally could
not do so.
In dealing with motions to disqualify in such situations, courts in
years past could be pretty strict, sometimes indignant to the existence of
such conflict. In more recent years they have become more ready to
invoke the concepts of implied waiver and laches. If a client had
adequate information about the other representation, and for whatever
reason refrained from objecting, disqualification may readily be denied.
Another relevant factor is whether there has been reasonable reliance by
the client on the propriety of representation of the lawyer whose
participation is under attack. A common phrase is that "the right of the
latter client to its choice of counsel should not easily be disturbed."
It is not possible to present an accurate picture in quantitative terms
of the pattern of decision in disqualification motions in contemporary
practice. On the basis of observation and conversation with other
observers, however, it seems to me that the courts have become reluctant
to disqualify on the basis of conflict of interest through the rule of
imputation. The courts are particularly reluctant where the nexus of
imputation is required and there is no indication of improper exposure of
relevant confidences among the lawyers involved. It would be going too
far to say that de facto the rule of imputation has been abolished in
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absence of a showing of abuse of client confidences. It might not be
going too far to say the rule of imputation has been substantially
curtailed in such situations.
XII. GOVER ING CONFLICTS BY CO TRACT
It is in this posture of the developing law that the problem of
conflicts of interest among law finn lawyers has become increasingly
governed by contract rather than by rule.
The legal basis for governing the problem by contract is the
provision in Rule 1.7(b) authorizing client consent to a conflict.. under
the conditions stated in that rule. 49 Model Rule I.7(b )(4), as most
recently revised by the ABA, provides that a lawyer or law firm may
undeJ1ake representations involving a conflict of interest if "each
affected client gives infonned consent, confinned in writing," provided
that the aJTangement is objectively reasonable, is not otherwise
prohibited by law, and does not involve representation of the clients
against each other in litigation. 50
The typical pattern concerns corporate clients or a corporate client
and an official of the corporate client. In the past, "consent" or "waiver"
situations would be addressed as they came up, with focus on a specific
situation presenting a conflict or potential conflict. Today, law firms arc
increasingly endeavoring to obtain infoJ111ed consent to future conflicts,
often called "advance waivers."
The propriety of advance waivers has been addressed by the ABA
Ethics Committee on two occasions, in 1993 and more recently in
2005.:'\1 In fonnal Opinion 93-372, issued in 1993, the Committee
concluded that an advance waiver would be proper only if, among other
requirements, there was specific identification of pm1ies whose
conflicting interests were involved.:'\2 This meant that in obtaining in the
present a waiver from one client, it was necessary at the same time to
identify the other client. even if the second representation was only
hypothetical.:'\' Thus, a confl ict waiver by Client A would have to refer
49 MODEL Rl'l I.:S OF PRor'L CONDUCT R. 1.7(b) (2003)
50 Set' Id. at R. 17(b)( I )-(3) See generallv Richard W Painter, Admllce /1'{J!1er oj
COI//Iiers, 13 GEO J LEGAL ETHICS 2X9 (2000).
51. ABA COl11m on Ethics and Prof! Responsibility. FOllllal Or 372 (1903): .AI3f\
COl1llll. on Ethics and Prof! Responsibility. Formal Op. 436 (2005).
52 ABA Comm. on Ethics and Prof! Responsibility. FOllllal Op 372 (1993).
53. ;:;I'e id.
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to an anticipated conflict with prospective Client B, and vice vcrsa."4
That requirement, if taken as obligatory, sharply limited advance waivers
by allowing them no greater scope than waiver of a present conflict. A
present conflict waiver addresses a specific situation (for example,
representation of Bank A and Borrower B in unrelated transactions), and,
under the 1993 Opinion, a future conflict waiver would have to be
equally specific (representation of Bank A in the eventuality that the
bank would undertake a loan to Borrower B in which the law fim1 would
be involved).55
It seems evident that the authors of the 1993 Opinion intended that
very result, in effect radically restricting the use of future waivers.
Many other analysts were of the opinion that future waivers could
have a much broader scope. I have thought that open-ended future
waivers were ethically improper in some circumstances and, in any
event, imprudent. On the other hand, a more limited future waiver has
seemed proper to me. This approach is exemplifled in the tem1S of such
a prototype waiver:
I. Corporation A, through its general counsel Lawyer
X,56 hereby consents to Law Firm B undertaking
representations adverse to Corporation A, and its
affiliates listed in the attached schedule, in present or
future transaction or litigation matters, except in:
(1) A litigation in which Law Firm B is also
representing Corporation A or is otherwise prohibited by
goveming rules oflaw or professional ethics; 57
(2) A transaction involving a merger or
acquisition of Corporation A or any of its affiliates, or to
54. See id.
55 fe/.
56. (n my opinion a law film ordinarily cannot rely on a future \",aiver unless the
client is independently represented in making the agreement. It would be awbvard and
usually not worth the trouble to negotiate a future waiver with an individual client (for
example, in a divorce or an estate planning representation), simply because of the
unlikelihood of future representations in which a conflict might occur Hence, as a
practical matter, future waivers are for corporations and other organizations, and usually
for those having a stream of legal problems. Organizations having a stream of legal
problems typically have an in-house law department or at least a regular outside counsel.
57. See MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT Rule 1.7(b)(3), an exception providing
thaI "the representation does not involve the assertion of a claim by one client against
another client ... in the same litigation.. "
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obtain more than [three] percent of the shares of
COllJOration A or any of its affiliates;
(3) Litigation involving claims of fraud, antitrust
conduct, RICO liability, punitive damages, or personal
conduct on the pali of directors or principal officers of
Corporation A or any of its affiliates.
2. Law Firm B agrees that lawyers working on any
matter adverse to Corporation A will be screened, as
. '8defined 111 ABA Model Rule 1.0(k).-'
509
Obviously, there could be many variations in such an approach. The
point is that the future waiver is not open-ended and that it precludes
representations that would be particularly offensive to the consenting
client.
The ABA Ethics Committee revisited the matter of future waivers on
May 11, 2005, in Fom1al Opinion 05-436. 59 As I read the opinion, it
comprehensively permits future waivers, subject to the following limits:
( 1) Conflicts cannot be waived that are in the exceptions
specified in Model Rule 1.7(b).
(2) Consent to a conflict is not consent "to the
disclosure or usc of the client's confidential infoJ1T1ation
. I J' ,,60agamst t 1e c lent.
(3) Consent may be required from the other client in the
matter undertaken in the future.
Formal Opinion 05-436 derives authority from changes made in the
recent revisions of Model Rule 1.7. Thus, the change in opinion is
justified by change in the terms of the rules governing conflict of interest
from vv'hat thosc rules were when the 1993 opinion was issued. It seems
to mc, however, that the change in approach also reflects a different
58 The ddlnition in Ivlodel Rule IO(k) is: '''Screened' denotes the isolation of a
lawyer from any' participation in a matter through the timely impo~ition of procedures
within a firm [hat are reasonably adequate under the circumstanecs to prolect information
that thc isolated lawyer IS obligated to protect under these Rules or OIher lav," lei. al R.
l.U(k) This delinitionls elaborated in Comments [X]. [01. and llOJ 10 include isolation of
support personnel and protection of client confidential information. ld. at R. 10 cmts.
p~]-rIO].
59. /\H,\ «()J]lIl1 on Ethic~ and Pro!' I Rcspon~ibility. Formal Op. 0)-436 (200))
60 /d.
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approach 111 substance - future waivers should be given much more
latitude.
In short, the regime under Formal Opinion 05-436 can properly be
called '"resolution of conflicts by contract" rather than "resolution by
rule." The normal operation of the newer regime will involve corporate
clients acting through their in-house general counsel.
X[[[. CONFLICTS CONTRACTS IN GLOBALIZED LAW PRACTICE
In my opinion, such a regime is entirely proper, not only in domestic
American law practice but especially in international practice.
First, the scope of conflicts limitations in contemporary practice is
often enlarged by contract, the terms being insisted on by the clients.
Under the concept of conflicts rules applicable to corporations that is
now' generally accepted, representation of one corporate affiliate does not
necessarily entail an engagement with other affiliates. 61 That situation
exists particularly where the affiliate has a separate law department.
Nevertheless, many large corporations now require an independent firm
to agree that the conflicts limitations of Rules 1.7 and 1.9 apply not only
to the corporate entity immediately involved in an engagement, but also
to all its corporate affiliates. The engagement letters can list dozens or
even more than a hundred affiliates. It could be argued that such an
agreement offends the principle of a lawyer's professional
independence. 62 However, law firms do not complain to the disciplinary
authority but simply accept the restriction, try to negotiate nalTower
terms, or decline the proposed representation. A regime of "conflicts by
contract" thus continues to be established from the clients' point of view.
Second, the trends in modern law practice make such a contract
regime increasingly attractive as a practical matter. Law firm size
continues to develop in the direction of larger and larger law firms. By
operation of the inlputation rule, the more lawyers in a firm the greater
the possibility of conflicts among various clients. At the same time, law
firm practice has continued to develop in the direction of ad hoc, matter-
specific engagements as contrasted with retainers or other on-going
client-lawyer relationships.
61. See MODEL RULES 01 PROF'r. CONDUCT R. 1.7 emt. [34] (2002); RESTATEMENT
(THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVER, !G l!\WYERS ~ 121 emt. d; ABA Comm on Ethics and
Profl Responsibility, Formal Op. 95-390 (1995); Charles Wolfram, COIJ)()rate-Family
Conflicts, 2 1. INS!. STUDY LFCi\L ETHICS 295 (1999).
62. See MODEL RULES Of- PROr'L CONDUCT R. 5.4,5.6 (2002).
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These trends interact with other developments. One is the increasing
specialization in Jaw practice and the proliferation of new sub-specialties.
Covering emerging sub-specialties is among the incentives for adding
new lawyers to a finn. Another influential trend is the expansion of
geographical scope of client business operations and cOITesponding client
legal needs. Many more law finns find it necessary to have an office in
Washington, D.C. or even New York, now that federal regulation and the
world money markets are of practical concern to more and more
corporate clients.
All of these trends also operate in international transactions - the
globalized political economy. Thirty years ago or so it came to be
recognized that a U.S. firm would be helped by having a branch in
London or Bmssels, and that a finn from the United Kingdom would be
similarly advantaged by offices in Washington and other American
cities. More recently the same realization has led finns to focus on
Shanghai and Mumbay.
A regime of conflicts by contract responds to this reality. Conflicts
contracts, like the conflicts rules themselves, protect two basic client
interests: Confidentiality of client infonnation and loyalty (and. as
appropriate, "zeal") in carrying out the representation. Governing
conflicts by contract allows the parties of a client-lawyer engagement to
tailor the protection of these interests. The functional rationale is
essentially the same as SUppOJ1S the regime of contract in international
trade generally. The contract regime in international trade allows p3J1ies
to put together transactions and relationships that arc attractive in pan
because they transcend the limits of parochial national laws. So also
with client-lawyer transactions.
The tailoring consists essentially of limiting the effect of the
imputation mle 63 That is, no one imagines that Lawyer A in Law Firm
A will represent Client X Corporation in litigation in New York or
London, and that Lawyer A will also at the same time represent some
other client against Client X in an arbitration in Zurich. Rather, v/hat the
conflicts contract will permit is, for example, that representation by
Lawyer A in L3\V Finn A of Corporation X will not prevent La\vyer B in
Law Firm A from representing another company in a licensing
negotiation with Corporation X.
(13 .'lee Moore. supra note 2. at 543.
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Governing the client-lawyer relationship by contract in this way
surely does not contravene a universal professional tradition. On the
contrary, it neutralizes, in greater or lesser degree, an imputation rule that
developed with peculiar rigor in law practice in the United States and
some other common law countries: If one lawyer in a finn was
precluded, all were precluded. That rule has proved too rigid even in our
system.
In contrast, the civil law systems generally have a two-part concept.
First. as universally recognized, the same lawyer cannot be acting both
for and against a client. Second, the imputation rule operates in more
limited scope in litigation matters, precluding a law office from handling
both sides of a litigation, but otherwise being a basis for client objection,
not a professional preclusion against the lawyers. As Professor Dondi
and I have explained:
Thus, Lawyer A in a finn may bring suit against a client
of Lawyer B in the same firm if the matter being handled
by Lawyer B is unrelated to the subject of the lawsuit.
However, one or both clients can object, and some
clients will object vehemently. The law finn thereupon
must choose which client to serve. 64
This approach treats clients as competent participants in the creation
of the client-lawyer relationship, which is certainly consistent with the
American tradition regarding business clients. It regards the basic
operative in law practice to be the individual lawyer, not the law firm.
That vision is in many ways very attractive.
64. H.-VARD & Do DI, slipra note 20. at 194.
